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I. DILEMMAS
I am overwhelmed at the generosity of this great law school and the
presence of so many whose works I admire and whose friendship I
cherish.  Thanks to Professor Stephan Landsman and so many of you
at DePaul for your work in organizing this event and, of course, Jus-
* Senior Judge, Federal District Court, Eastern District of New York.  This is the basis of a
speech given at the Clifford Symposium on Tort Law and Social Policy at DePaul University,
April 25, 2014.  I am grateful for the help of my law clerks Andrew Braver and Tulsi E. Gaonkar
(2013–2014), and Nora Ahmed and Caitrin McKiernan (2014–2015).
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tice Stephen Breyer’s remarkable introduction is one I am not pre-
pared to disagree with.
If you dig down through the debris of my judicial work of almost
half a century, you will find much the same kinds of decisional sedi-
ment as other federal trial judges, colleagues in whose names I accept
this honor.1
We have been fortunate participants in a post-World War II world
where Americans lobbied for the enactment of, and adherence to,
laws preventing discrimination based on race, gender, disability, age,
sexual orientation, and other invidiousness.
A pause to glance back on how our federal trial courts address
some of our massive legal problems and our biases, stereotypes, and
general litigation practices seems in order.
A. Law’s Fundamental Dilemma
In the first days of law school, we began to sense one of the law’s
central dilemmas.  Law holds itself out as treating each person
equally.  As Professor Judith Resnik put it, “[T]he great ambitions of
the twentieth century [were] equality and dignity . . . .”2  But because
every person is different, the impact of the law on each person is nec-
essarily different.  We have had a “Catch-22” obvious from the begin-
ning in the Declaration of Independence’s principle: “all . . . are
created equal.”3  But they are not—and cannot be—treated equally
by the law.
In some aspects the law recognizes the individual needs of parties;
in others it stresses uniformity.  The tide shifts: sentencing and class
action are illustrative.4
Each day, district judges are enthralled by observing through their
window to the world—the courtroom—the incredible diversity of hu-
manity in all its bewitching and sordid guises.  Yet our great court-
house factories with their procrustean, cookie-cutting assembly lines
1. Cf. Daniel Sandstrom, My Life as a Writer: An Interview with Philip Roth, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
16, 2014, at BR14 (Philip Roth, speaking for himself and us less talented, quoting the great
heavyweight Joe Louis, “I did the best I could with what I had”).
2. Judith Resnik, Globalization(s), Privatization(s), Constitutionalilzation, and Statization:
Icons and Experiences of Sovereignty in the 21st Century, 11 INT. J. CONST. L. 162, 163 (2013).
3. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para 2. (U.S. 1776).
4. See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein & Christopher Wimmer, Sentencing in the United States, in CUR-
RENT TRENDS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS IN HONOR
OF PROFESSOR ELIAHU HARNON 453 (Anat Horovitz & M. Krennitzer eds., 2009) (covering a
history of U.S. sentencing from colonial punitive uniformity, to postindependence individual re-
habilitation, to guideline uniformity, to current increasing emphasis on the individual).
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are expected to convert these diverse materials into uniform, one-size-
fits-all decisions.
The humanitarian Denis Donoghue encapsulated our problem
when he pointed out “the judicial casuistry involved in the application
of principles to cases that are always in some respects unique.”5
Chicago poet Carl Sandburg’s insight into the law’s dilemma was
put in The People, Yes:
“Do you solemnly swear before the ever-
living God that the testimony you
are about to give in this cause shall
be the truth, the whole truth, and
nothing but the truth?”
“No, I don’t. I can tell you what I saw
and what I heard and I’ll swear to
that by the everliving God but the
more I study about it the more sure
I am that nobody but the everliving
God knows the whole truth and if
you summoned Christ as a witness in
this case what He would tell you
would burn your insides with the
pity and the mystery of it.”6
Anatole France’s take on the problem of dealing with humankind’s
diversity in abstract legal uniformity was cryptic and cynical:  “[T]he
majestic equality of the laws . . . forbid rich and poor alike to sleep
under the bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal their bread.”7
The law constructs rigid cubbyholes into which we stuff diverse peo-
ple and situations to achieve the illusion of equality.  It is difficult to
soften these matrices to meet individual differences.  This is not to say
that we ignore this problem.  For example, in dealing with the educa-
tion of children with disabilities, the law increasingly recognizes that
“every child is unique” and we go to great lengths to provide an ap-
propriate education for each child.8
5. See generally Denis Donoghue, Introduction to DAEDALUS, Winter 2014, at 5 (an issue
entitled “What Humanists Do”).
6. CARL SANDBURG, THE PEOPLE, YES 193 (1936), quoted in Jack B. Weinstein, Some Diffi-
culties in Devising Rules for Determining Truth in Judicial Trials, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 233, 240
(1966).
7. ANATOLE FRANCE, THE RED LILY 95 (1910), cited in T. Ward Frampton, Bivens’s Revi-
sions: Constitutional Torts After Minneci v. Pollard, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1711, 1734 n.167 (2012).
8. See, e.g., Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2012) (re-
quiring states receiving federal funds to provide “all children with disabilities” a “free appropri-
ate public education”); T.M. ex rel. A.M. v. Cornwall Cent. Sch. Dist., 752 F.3d 145, 161 (2d Cir.
2014) (“Because every child is unique, determining whether a student has been placed in the
least restrictive environment requires a flexible, fact-specific analysis.” (internal quotation marks
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After the Agent Orange case was settled, Special Master Kenneth
Feinberg and I talked about how to distribute the fund.  I suggested
we pitch a tent in the park across from the court.  I would sit on cush-
ions with chests of gold coins alongside.  And the veterans would
come in one at a time to get their fair share.  But then I thought: the
second veteran would probably say, “Why should he get more than
me?  My life was harder than his; I should get more.”  So we hit on
devising a uniform insurance policy for herbicide-exposed veterans
and access for all their families to social work agencies in each state.
Uniformity is sometimes administratively convenient.  It has the ad-
vantage of providing assurances that everyone’s rights are protected
whether they need protection or not. Gideon,9 Miranda,10 and pro se
litigation11 are examples.  In pro se cases, the court must make special
efforts to keep litigants out of the law’s procedural tar pits through
such techniques as liberal interpretation of pleadings and warnings on
summary judgment.12
omitted)).  Employers of the disabled must also try to provide adequate individual accommoda-
tions. See Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–12117.
9. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (providing the right to counsel in all criminal
cases).
10. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (providing notice of rights to all those arrested).
11. See Wechsler v. R.D. Mgmt. Corp., 861 F. Supp. 1153, 1157 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (Glasser, J.).
Speaking of pro se cases:
Prompted . . . are questions concerning the role of a judge.  More specifically, is it ever
appropriate for a judge to intervene in the prosecution of a lawsuit, and if it is, when
and under what circumstances?  Does the [Court of Appeals] direct the district court to
enlist in the fray on behalf of all pro se litigants? . . .  [D]oes the solicitude it commands
extend to a wealthy and sophisticated pro se litigant?
Id. As the Supreme Court pointed out:
[W]e have never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be
interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.  As we
have noted before, “in the long run, experience teaches that strict adherence to the
procedural requirements specified by the legislature is the best guarantee of even-
handed administration of law.”
McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (footnote omitted) (quoting Mohasco Corp. v.
Silver, 447 U.S. 807 (1980)).
12. See, e.g., Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474–75 (2d Cir. 2006).
It is well established that the submissions of a pro se litigant must be construed liber-
ally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest. . . .
This policy of liberally construing pro se submissions is driven by the understanding
that implicit in the right of self-representation is an obligation on the part of the court
to make reasonable allowances to protect pro se litigants from inadvertent forfeiture of
important rights because of their lack of legal training.
Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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B. Sentencing
The difficulties in achieving uniformity across cases is most clearly
revealed in sentencing.  Congress and the Sentencing Commission had
obfuscated the issue by providing for seeming uniformity through
mandatory guidelines, compelling gross individual injustices.13  The
Supreme Court has sanitized that cesspool with Justice Stephen
Breyer’s opinion in Booker, turning the ukases of the Sentencing
Commission into mere suggestions.14  But congressional minimum
sentence statutes continue to mandate gross injustices.15
Individual judges vary in their view of what is just.  Even a single
judge is not always consistent.16  But at least we have now been al-
lowed to avoid the hypocrisies involved in mechanical uniformity in
sentencing, and we are seeking some consensus in our approaches to
13. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1).
14. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
15. See United States v. C.R., 972 F. Supp. 2d 457 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (revisiting mandatory,
inappropriately harsh sentencing requirements); see also United States v. Diaz, No.
11–CR–00821–2 (JG), 2013 WL 322243, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2013) (“[T]he mandatory mini-
mum sentences in drug trafficking cases distort the sentencing process and mandate unjust
sentences.”); United States v. Dossie, 851 F. Supp. 2d 478, 484 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (noting that in
drug cases statutory minimums are frequently used to “overly punish a defendant”); cf. Jess
Bravin, Two Supreme Court Justices Say Criminal-Justice System Isn’t Working, WALL ST. J.
(Mar. 24, 2015, 7:46 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/two-supreme-court-justices-say-criminal-
justice-system-isnt-working-1427197613 (“Justice Breyer says mandatory minimums are a ‘terri-
ble idea.’”); Mark W. Bennett, How Mandatory Minimums Forced Me To Send More than 1,000
Nonviolent Drug Offenders to Federal Prison, NATION (Oct. 24, 2012), http://
www.thenation.com/article/170815/how-mandatory-minimums-forced-me-send-more-1000-non-
violent-drug-offenders-federal-pri (“Many people across the political spectrum have spoken out
against the insanity of mandatory minimums.”); Letter from Hon. Robert Holmes Bell, Chair,
Criminal Law Comm., Judicial Conference of the U.S., to Hon. Patrick J. Leahy, Chair, Comm.
on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate 1 (Sept. 17, 2013) (“For 60 years, the Judicial Conference has
consistently and vigorously opposed mandatory minimums and has supported measures for their
repeal or to ameliorate their effects.”). But see Letter from Jonathan J. Wroblewiski, Director,
Office of Policy and Legislation, Office of the Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to
Hon. Patti B. Saris, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 12 (July 11, 2013) (“[W]e do not support the
elimination or dramatic reduction of any existing mandatory minimum penalties.”); Letter from
Anne Gannon, Nat’l Coordinator for Child Exploitation Prevention & Interdiction, Office of the
Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Hon. Patti B. Saris, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n
6 (Mar. 5, 2013) (“[T]he Department opposes the elimination of, or significant reduction in,
mandatory minimum sentences in the event that the receipt and possession offenses are
merged.”).
16. I worry about that inconsistency.  I am in the process, with the help of my law clerks, of
developing a kind of guidelines for my own sentences: do I treat a garden variety heroin im-
porter on Monday as I do on Friday?  Is there a garden-variety importation case? See, e.g.,
United States v. G.L., No. 12-CR-475, 2015 WL 1517397, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2015) (attempt-
ing to rationalize sentences by laying out general criteria for “similar” cases). Cf. John Tierney,
To Choose Is To Lose, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2011, at MM33 (discussing the effects of decision
fatigue).
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reducing incarceration and avoiding unnecessary destruction of lives
and communities by excessive punishment.17
Courts and judges are newly embarking on a course of closely su-
pervising individual defendants before and after conviction to im-
prove their capacities and opportunities to overcome crime and
poverty.18  Using medical and social work personnel,19 court proba-
tion officers, and private institutions, judges themselves work inten-
sively to help individuals move from the criminal world into that of
the law abiding.  The shift marks a return to individual rehabilitation
rather than mass uniform rules of incarceration.  One of the anomalies
of these programs is that some criminals obtain more help from soci-
ety than their peers who struggle alone painfully but successfully to
lead lawful lives.
C. Class Action
In the civil arena, the class action is one way of equalizing the
power of enfeebled individuals and the powerful entities they
confront.
In an address on rules for federal trial judges dealing with diversi-
ties of the real world and mass cases, I pointed out that:
The doors were opened to our courthouses for the poor, the op-
pressed, the legally deprived by the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. Easy pleading, full discovery, and subsequent class action
17. See, e.g., Stephanie Clifford, Citing Fairness, U.S. Judge Acts To Undo Sentence He Was
Forced to Impose, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2014, at A16; Eric H. Holder, Jr., Time To Tackle Unfin-
ished Business in Criminal Justice Reform, WASH. POST (Feb. 27, 2015), http://www.washington
post.com/opinions/time-to-tackle-unfinished-business-in-criminal-justice-reform/2015/02/27/
e17878bc-bdf9-11e4-bdfa-b8e8f594e6ee_story.html (noting an emerging consensus in favor of
federal drug sentencing reform and continuing initiatives to reduce the use of mandatory mini-
mum sentences for low-level drug offenses); Matt Apuzzo, Unlikely Allies Push for a Liberaliza-
tion of Sentencing Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2014, at A13 (reporting that Attorney General Eric
Holder had begun outreach with Republican Congresspersons to form a bipartisan consensus for
legislation that would reduce sentences for certain drug crimes).
18. See, e.g., ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION IN THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK:
THE PRETRIAL OPPORTUNITY PROGRAM AND THE SPECIAL OPTIONS SERVICES PROGRAM
(2014), available at https://img.nyed.uscourts.gov/files/local_rules/EDNY-TWOYEARREPORT-
ATI_Programs_April-2014.pdf (a report to the Board of Judges, U.S. District Court, E.D.N.Y.,
by Judges John Gleeson, Dora Irizarry, Joanna Seybert, Steven Gold, Joan Azarack, Robert
Levy, Cheryl Pollak, and Gary Brown); Memorandum from Senior Judges Charles P. Sifton &
Jack B. Weinstein on a Proposed Drug Court Program to Chief Judge Korman & Members of
the Board of Judges, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Nov. 30, 2005)
(on file with author). Cf. Andrew Keshner, Holder Endorses Eastern District Alternatives to
Prison, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 31, 2014, at 1, available at http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/
id=1202675146471/Holder-Endorses-Eastern-District-Alternatives-to-Prison.
19. Jack B. Weinstein, In Response to Stein Award at Fordham Law School (Nov. 30, 2013)
(discussing interplay between law and social work) (on file with author).
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amendments were critical.  That door is now being closed by reduc-
ing the availability of class actions through legislation and decisions,
by tightening pleading rules, by limiting discovery, by encouraging
summary judgment, by increasing standing requirements, by favor-
ing arbitrations over litigation, and by a generally negative attitude
towards joint action through unions, other voluntary associations, or
individuals being denied standing.20
By increasingly emphasizing and requiring more and more uniformity
among the putative members of the class with respect to relevant is-
sues, the opportunity for individuals to utilize class actions as an
equalizing device is being diminished.
II. MECHANISMS
A. Juries and Others
The United States legal system provides some built-in mechanisms
to minimize injustice created by unnecessary emphasis on uniformity.
Particularly important is the jury, which can exercise its equitable
powers to nullify by imposing its view of the facts and law.21
Arbitration, mediation, and settlement practices in which assent is
voluntary also sometimes soften the impact of law that may seem too
rigid under the circumstances.  Government attorneys—aware of the
fact that both sides of a conflict are often constituents—properly
sometimes try to reduce unnecessary harshness in enforcement.22
B. Judges
Trial judges are called on to help level the playing field, to apply
equally and uniformly the Constitution and laws.  Sitting in a unique
position between the lawmakers and the people, they are the repre-
sentatives and human face of the law.
But what is the role of a trial judge?  To merely “call balls and
strikes”?23  To try to interpret and apply law in a way that will help
20. Jack B. Weinstein, Federal Trial Judges: Dealing with the Real World, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV.
(forthcoming Winter 2015) [hereinafter Weinstein, Dealing with the Real World].
21. See United States v. Polouizzi, 687 F. Supp. 2d 133, 167–68 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (outlining my
view that juries should know what punishment could be imposed in some cases as they did in
eighteenth-century Britain); see also Jack B. Weinstein, Considering Jury “Nullification”: When
May and Should a Jury Reject the Law To Do Justice?, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 239 (1993); Jack B.
Weinstein, Proceedings of the Fifty-Third Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit:
Panel Discussion on Jury Nullification, 145 F.R.D. 149, 170 (1993) (comments on jury
nullification).
22. See generally Jack B. Weinstein, Some Ethical and Political Problems of a Government
Attorney, 18 ME. L. REV. 155 (1966).
23. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. To Be Chief Justice of the
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56 (2005) (speaking
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society?  To apply the law to individuals in a way that will assist them?
For a trial judge, all three options must be answered “yes.”24  In ap-
proaching individual and generic problems, a judge must take account
and be aware of the diversity of situations and people before the
court, as well as of the necessity of some uniform interpretation of the
law so it may be complied with by laypersons and enforced.25
Trial judges’ empathy and appreciation of the feelings they have for
fellow men and women are vital elements in the resolution of legal
disputes.  To force judges to rigidly and mechanically apply unjust
laws, such as those requiring oversentencing, is to strip them of part of
their own humanity.  Where they must impose an unfair rule, they
have the duty to expose the injustice26 and to act with humanity in
before the Senate Judiciary Committee at his confirmation hearing, United States Supreme
Court Chief Justice John Roberts stated, “I will remember that it’s my job to call balls and
strikes, and not to pitch or bat”).
24. See Jack B. Weinstein, Essay, The Roles of a Federal District Court Judge, 76 BROOK. L.
REV. 439, 451 (2011).
While the trial court is obliged to follow a ruling decision, its position observing peo-
ple and situations may . . . provide a useful understanding of developing problems and
the need for change.  The trial judge physically observes the people who are affected by
the law and may sense their problems through direct interactions, rather than through
the indirect medium of the record or abstract analysis.
Id.
25. Cf. Letter from Judge Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., Federal District of Massachusetts, to Sen-
ator Leverette Saltonstall (Jan. 12, 1959), reprinted in WALTER F. MURPHY & C. HERMAN
PRITCHETT, COURTS, JUDGES, AND POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 456
(3d ed. 1961).
[A] District Judge has a chance to help the lawyers frame the issues and develop the
facts so that there may be a meaningful and complete record.  He may innovate proce-
dures promoting fairness, simplification, economy, and expedition.  By instructions to
juries and, in appropriate cases, by comments on the evidence he may help the jurors
better to understand their high civic function.  He is a teacher of parties, witnesses,
petitioners for naturalization, and even casual visitors to his court.  His conduct of a
trial may fashion and sustain the moral principles of the community.  More even than
the rules of constitutional, statutory, and common law he applies, his character and
personal distinction, open to daily inspection in his courtroom, constitute the guaran-
tees of due process.
Id.
26. See, e.g., United States v. Ingram, 721 F.3d 35, 43 n.9 (2d Cir. 2013) (Calabresi, J., concur-
ring) (“[W]e judges have a right—a duty even—to express criticism of legislative judgments that
require us to uphold results we think are wrong.”); Jack B. Weinstein, Beyond the Courtroom,
Into the World: The Federal Trial Judge and Fact-Finding, ANN. SURV. AM. L. (forthcoming
2015) (“That we may be reversed on appeal must not inhibit us.”). See generally Jack B. Wein-
stein, Every Day Is a Good Day for a Judge To Lay Down His Professional Life for Justice, 32
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 131 (2004); Jack B. Weinstein & Mae C. Quinn, Some Reflections on the
Federal Judiciary Role During the War on Drugs, in THE JUDICIAL ROLE IN CRIMINAL PROCEED-
INGS 269 (Sean Doran & John D. Jackson eds., 2000); Jack B. Weinstein & Nicholas R. Turner,
The Cost of Avoiding Injustice by Guideline Circumventions, 9 FED. SENT’G REP. 298 (1997);
Jack B. Weinstein, The Effect of Sentencing on Women, Men, the Family, and the Community, 5
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 169 (1996); Jack B. Weinstein, Some Reflections on Seven Lean Years of
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administering and interpreting the law in what they conceive to be a
just manner.27
C. Legal Community
In the first half of the 20th century, there was significant coopera-
tion at the national level in articulating rules of law appropriate to the
challenges of an increasingly complex society and economy.  While
proceduralists were laying the foundation for the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, the American Law Institute (ALI) was formulating
critical restatements and model codes to meet modern conditions.
The mission of the ALI was to simplify the law, to make it workable in
a new society, and to clarify it.28  This effort drew together lawyers,
judges, and professors from across the country.  While it had both sup-
porters and critics, the ALI focused the national legal profession on
vital common questions.  The argument that the Restatements were
misguided attempts to simplify what could not be made simple is ap-
plicable to almost any statement of a legal rule and should not be the
cold water thrown on reforming forges.29  For mass actions, the ALI
recently assessed some of the critical problems with its 2010 publica-
Guidelines Sentencing, 8 FED. SENT’G REP. 12 (1995); Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., A Trial Judge’s
Freedom and Responsibility, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1303 (1952) (“[C]learly ethical in its nature
. . . .”).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695–96 (2013) (holding that federal
law defining marriage as only between a man and a woman is an unconstitutional deprivation of
liberty under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause); Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455,
2464 (2012) (“[M]andatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles violate[s] the Eighth
Amendment.”); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (“[T]he death penalty is dispropor-
tionate punishment for offenders under 18 . . . .”); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002)
(holding that the execution of mentally retarded criminals violates the Eighth Amendment);
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (“We conclude that in the field of public educa-
tion the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.  Separate educational facilities are inher-
ently unequal.”).
28. G. Edward White, The American Law Institute and the Triumph of Modernist Jurispru-
dence, 15 LAW & HIST. REV. 1, 7 (1997) (“The founders of the ALI saw the ‘complexity’ of
contemporary American society . . . as flowing, in significant part, from the growth and diversifi-
cation of the American economy . . . .”).
29. Charles E. Clark, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 42 YALE L.J. 643, 653 (1933)
(“Our civilization is complex and our law, if it is to keep abreast of business and social life,
cannot be simple.”).
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tion of the Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation.30  Courts
have been receptive to this contribution.31
Conflict of law rules also continue to need reform permitting effec-
tive utilization of aggregate litigation.  Courts are currently required
to apply the choice of law rule of the state in which they sit,32 but
there have been repeated calls for reforms in the area of conflict of
laws from attorneys, professors, and judges that would permit a single
court to analyze claims from around the country under one law in a
more unified fashion.33
States differ in the particularities of their laws.  Each state has an
interest in the fair and efficient resolution of mass cases in which its
residents have alleged an injury.  Yet, we now participate in a national
and global economy where consumers and producers interact with rel-
atively little concern for state boundaries.  Effective treatment of legal
claims arising from attendant litigation may require more emphasis on
a flexible view of appropriate choice of law and venue to permit one
judge and one law in mass cases.34  Uniformity sometimes has advan-
30. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION (2010); see also Judith Resnik, Com-
pared to What?: ALI Aggregation and the Shifting Contours of Due Process and of Lawyers’
Powers, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 628, 686 (2011) (noting the difficulty that objectors to class
action settlements would have in re-opening and re-aggregating their claims under the ALI’s
2009 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION).
31. See Karen Shanley, The Institute in the Courts: Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litiga-
tion, ALI REP., Summer 2012, at 4.
As courts continue to deal with new issues and challenges in class-action lawsuits,
they are frequently turning to the Institute’s Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litiga-
tion for guidance, seeking ways to promote judicial efficiency without sacrificing indi-
vidual parties’ rights.  Recently, the Principles have been particularly influential in
addressing a problem common in class actions, but foreign to simpler, non-aggregate
proceedings: who gets paid when settlements are reached?
Id. at 6.
32. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496–97 (1941).
Whatever lack of uniformity this may produce between federal courts in different states
is attributable to our federal system, which leaves to a state, within the limits permitted
by the Constitution, the right to pursue local policies diverging from those of its neigh-
bors.  It is not for the federal courts to thwart such local policies by enforcing an inde-
pendent “general law” of conflict of laws.
Id. at 496.
33. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.05 & cmt. (2015) (not-
ing the principles and methods by which a court can aggregate claims from multiple jurisdic-
tions). See generally Luke McCloud & David Rosenberg, A Solution to the Choice of Law
Problem of Differing State Laws in Class Actions: Average Law, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 374
(2011); Linda Silberman, The Role of Choice of Law in National Class Actions, 156 U. PA. L.
REV. 2001 (2008); Friedrich K. Juenger, The Complex Litigation Project’s Tort Choice-of-Law
Rules, 54 LA. L. REV. 907 (1994); Paul S. Bird, Note, Mass Tort Litigation: A Statutory Solution
to the Choice of Law Impasse, 96 YALE L.J. 1077 (1987).
34. See Jack B. Weinstein, Mass Tort Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in a Multinational World
Communicating by Extraterrestrial Satellites, 37 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 145, 151 (2001) (discussing
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tages of effective administration for the benefit of many over diverse
treatment for the theoretical benefit of individual control.
III. MASS ACTIONS
Mass tort litigation exemplifies some of the law’s incongruities.  It is
rife with issues posed largely by the need to deal fairly, yet uniformly,
with individuals in groups.  I but touch on some of the dissonance.
A. Unavailability of Efficient Procedures for Courts
We face the probability of increased massive litigations, but we are
reducing our courts’ ability to handle such cases by reducing the avail-
ability of procedures for efficiency, such as class actions.
Massive litigations present challenging issues for trial court adminis-
tration.  In recent years, in addition to more typical mass tort cases,
we have seen a series of devastating disasters, both natural and man-
made—the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center, Hurricane Katrina,
the British Petroleum Oil Spill, and Hurricane Sandy, to name a few.
These events have introduced new challenges in managing mass litiga-
tions.35  They involve large numbers of cases across state and federal
district court lines with a broad range of issues from personal injury
and death to property damage, economic loss, and environmental deg-
radation.36  We tend to think of the individual states and of federal
districts (and circuits) as separate, but the forces of nature and the
integration of national life (within and between states and nations)
sometimes will require ignoring state lines to improve fairness and ef-
ficiency in dealing with future mass problems.
Hurricane Sandy, for instance, has given rise to thousands of claims
throughout the northeast.  Over 800 cases related to Hurricane Sandy
are currently pending in the Eastern District of New York alone.37
the need to expand personal jurisdiction to permit a single court and law to deal with massive
litigations); see also infra notes 37–40 and accompanying text (discussing the need to ignore state
lines in administrating cases deriving from massive disasters).
35. See generally Jack B. Weinstein, Procedural and Substantive Problems in Complex Litiga-
tion Arising from Disasters, 5 TOURO L. REV. 1 (1998).
36. See, e.g., Edward F. Sherman, The BP Oil Spill Litigation and Evolving Supervision of
Multidistrict Litigation Judges, 30 MISS. C. L. REV. 237 (2011).
The BP Oil Spill Litigation presents some of the most challenging issues for court ad-
ministration in any piece of complex litigation.  The very magnitude of the litigation—
involving dozens of different kinds of claims across the five Gulf states directly affected
but also numerous claims from outside that area and based on a wide range of tort,
environmental, statutory, and maritime law—reflects the problems it poses.
Id. at 237.
37. For the cases that are pending, see Docket No. 41-MC-14 (E.D.N.Y). See also, e.g., An-
drew Keshner, Tentative Deals Reached in 160 Sandy Cases, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 4, 2015, at 1 (noting
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The majority involve insurance claims dealing with coverage and busi-
ness interruption disputes.38   They center on common legal and fac-
tual issues, including whether the losses result from wind or water
damage, anticoncurrent causation clauses, business interruption policy
coverage, coinsurance, and other insurance problems.39  There are
also Hurricane Sandy-related employment law, tenants’ rights, dis-
crimination, and personal injury claims pending in various courts.40
The same range of issues, and of tort claims, was litigated in the
wake of Hurricane Katrina.41  Varying state laws of insurance prevent
uniformity from state to state, though Federal Emergency Manage-
ment Association (FEMA) regulations provide a substantial degree of
uniform procedures for resolving damage issues.  New Jersey state
that “[o]f the 1,329 Eastern District cases, 421 have been resolved.  If finalized, the 160 settle-
ments disclosed . . . would bring the total to 581”); Andrew Keshner, Eastern District Plan for
Handling Sandy Lawsuits Moves Forward, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 12, 2014, at 1.
38. See Superstorm Sandy Insurance Litigation, HARRISMARTIN PUBLISHING, http://harrismar-
tin.com/publication/archive/superstorm_sandy/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2015) (archiving the Super-
storm Sandy Insurance Coverage Litigation Report, online and monthly print reports that track
insurance coverage litigation filed in the wake of Superstorm Sandy).
39. See Docket No. 41-MC-14 (E.D.N.Y); see also, e.g., Sebastien Malo, New York Court
Gives FEMA More Time To Help Settle Sandy Litigation, REUTERS (Feb. 18, 2015, 6:45 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/18/us-usa-sandy-insurance-idUSKBN0LM2ET20150218
(“[T]he New York State attorney general’s office has opened a criminal investigation into what it
calls ‘insurance issues’ related to damaged caused by Sandy . . . .”); Andrew Keshner & Tania
Karas, Eastern District Awash in Sandy Insurance Cases, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 13, 2014, at 1; Christine
Simmons, Cleary Sues Insurer To Recover Income Lost in Sandy’s Wake, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 10, 2014,
at 1.
40. See, e.g., Brooklyn Ctr. for Independence of the Disabled v. Bloomberg, 290 F.R.D. 409
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (certifying a class action brought by disability rights advocates who claimed the
city failed to accommodate the disabled during disasters such as Superstorm Sandy); Keith A.
Bruett et al., Coping with the Impacts of Superstorm Sandy, in ASPATORE SPECIAL REPORT: THE
ONGOING IMPACT OF HURRICANE SANDY ON THE LEGAL COMMUNITY 15 (2013).
41. See Alex J. Lathrop, From Katrina to Sandy: Lessons from the Whirlwind, WESTLAW J.
INS. COVERAGE, Mar. 29, 2013, at 3 (“After Katrina, many policyholders were surprised to learn
that even though they had coverage for ‘windstorms’—either because windstorms were a specifi-
cally enumerated named peril or because they were not excluded from their all-risk coverage—
insurers nevertheless denied their claims because they did not have coverage for water dam-
age.”); see also Robert Redfearn, Jr., Will Hurricane Katrina Legal Issues Be Resurrected in
Sandy Claims?, INS. J. (Nov. 18, 2013), http://www.insurancejournal.com/magazines/legalbeat/
2013/11/18/311009.htm (“Following Hurricane Katrina, courts in Louisiana and Mississippi dealt
with thorny legal issues such as whether damage was caused by wind and/or rain, the resulting
coverage of such damage under homeowner, business and flood insurance policies and the scope
of an insurance agent’s duty to provide information about and procure coverage for their cus-
tomers.”).  In the Gulf Coast, British Petroleum’s compensation scheme, administered by Ken-
neth Feinberg, permitted ignoring some differences among the laws of the affected states.  Amy
D. Paul, Rethinking Oil Spill Compensation Schemes: The Causation Inquiry, 9 LOYOLA MAR.
L.J. 137, 147–49 (2011).
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courts are devising methods of consolidation, as is the Eastern District
of New York.42
Scientists tell us that we should expect to see an increase in natural
disasters in coming years.43  History tells us that we should be pre-
pared for more human-made disasters.  Yet, even as we face a proba-
ble increase in mass actions, courts’ tools to handle them efficiently
are being restricted.  An assault on claim consolidation has contracted
the availability of efficacious class actions and other forms of
aggregation.44
The asbestos-related personal injury and wrongful death cases are
examples.  Trying hundreds of thousands of asbestos-related claims on
42. See, e.g., In re Hurricane Sandy, No. 14 MC 41 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2014) (“Case Manage-
ment Order No. 1”); Young Ha, N.J. Court Seeking Ways To Expedite Sandy Flood Litigation
Process, INS. J. (Feb. 26, 2014), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/east/2014/02/26/
321568.htm; Letter from Brian R. Martinotti, Judge, Superior Court of New Jersey, to Jack B.
Weinstein (Mar. 10, 2014) (on file with author) (discussing New Jersey judges’ efforts to consoli-
date Superstorm Sandy claims and coordinate case management).
43. See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE
2014: SYNTHESIS REPORT (R.K. Pachuari et al. eds., 2014) available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/
assessment-report/ar5/syr/SYR_AR5_FINAL_full.pdf; NAT’L CLIMATE ASSESSMENT DEV. AD-
VISORY COMM., CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES: THIRD NATIONAL CLIMATE
ASSESSMENT REPORT (Jerry M. Melillo et al. eds., 2014), available at http://
nca2014.globalchange.gov/downloads; VIVIEN GORNITZ, RISING SEAS: PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE
(2013); INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, MANAGING THE RISKS OF EX-
TREME EVENTS AND DISASTERS TO ADVANCE CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION (Christopher B.
Field et al. eds., 2013), available at http://ipcc-wg2.gov/SREX/images/uploads/SREX-
All_FINAL.pdf; THE LAW OF ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE: U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL
ASPECTS (Michael B. Gerrard & Katrina Fischer Kuh eds., 2012). See also Have We Reached the
Point of No Return on Climate Change?, SCI. AM. (Apr. 13, 2015), http://
www.scientificamerican.com/article/have-we-passed-the-point-of-no-return-on-climate-change/;
Henry Fountain, California Drought Is Worsened by Global Warming, Scientists Say, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 2, 2015, at A16; Justin Gillis, U.N. Panel Issues Its Starkest Warning Yet on Global
Warming, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2014, at A8; Russell Shorto, Water Works, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13,
2014, at MM20.
44. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557 (2011) (“[Rule 23(b)(2)]
does not authorize class certification when each class member would be entitled to an individual-
ized award of monetary damages.”); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753
(2011) (holding that California rule rendering class-wide arbitration waivers potentially uncon-
scionable is preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815,
864 (1999) (holding that Rule 23(b)(1)(B) mandatory class certification under “limited funds”
theory not allowed when limitation of funds is due to prior settlement by the parties); Amchem
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 624–25 (1997) (holding that individual differences between
putative class members prevents mass certification of settlement class for asbestos tort claims).
See generally Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 623 (2012) (“Courts in recent years have
ramped up the standards governing the certification of damages classes and created new stand-
ing requirements for consumer class actions.”); Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions,
90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 761 (2013) (“Recent case law has also imposed rigorous obligations on
plaintiffs in defining the scope of the putative class action.”); Tony Mauro, Justices May Shy
Away from Overturning Class Precedent, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 6, 2014, at 2.
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an individual or small-scale court-by-court basis was unrealistic and
inefficient.45  Appellate courts’ Rule 23 requirements of commonality,
typicality, and predominance barred certification of asbestos claims.46
Following the same analysis, the Multidistrict Litigation Panel repeat-
edly rejected multidistricting the asbestos litigation.47
Individual trial judges and courts sometimes found their efforts to
consolidate asbestos cases curtailed.  For example, I successfully con-
solidated for trial seventy-nine asbestos-related cases arising from ex-
posure in the New York Navy Shipyard.48  Another judge’s
consolidation of many similar cases involving stationary engineers was
rejected—to my mind unwisely—by the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.49  It was only at the urging of a self-appointed committee of
federal trial judges that the Multidistrict Litigation Panel finally re-
lented in the early 1990s and sent all the federal cases to a single fed-
eral judge.50  Massive tobacco tort cases were also blocked, allowing
less effective civil prosecutions.51  Limiting trial courts’ ability to effec-
45. See JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION: THE EFFECT OF
CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OTHER MULTIPARTY DEVICES 141 (1995) [hereinafter
INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE] (“If we persist in trying cases on an individual or even small-scale jurisdic-
tion-by-jurisdiction basis, many plaintiffs will die before they are compensated, a great many will
wait years, and some may receive nothing as the available monies are dribbled away by earlier
awards and transaction costs.”).
46. See In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706, 712 (5th Cir. 1990) (denying certification for trial
of a class of 2,990 asbestos claimants in Eastern Texas).
47. See In re Asbestos & Asbestos Insulation Material Prods. Liab. Litig., 431 F. Supp. 906,
909–10 (J.P.M.L. 1977) (denying consolidation of 103 asbestos-related personal injury claims on
grounds that the plaintiffs were from many different trades and the cases presented differing
causation and medical needs); see also In re Asbestos Sch. Prods. Liab. Litig., 606 F. Supp. 713,
714 (J.P.M.L. 1985) (denying consolidation in school district cases); In re Asbestos Prods. Liab.
Litig. II, No. MDL-416 (J.P.M.L. Mar. 13, 1980) (unpublished order) (same).
48. See In re Brooklyn Navy Yard Asbestos Litig., 971 F.2d 831, 836 n.1 (2d Cir. 1992) (ap-
proving consolidation of cases for trial).
49. Malcolm v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 995 F.2d 346, 353 (2d Cir. 1993) (denying consolidation of
600 asbestos cases due to lack of commonality of geographic location of injury); see also In re
Allied-Signal Inc., 915 F.2d 190, 192 (6th Cir. 1990) (referencing attempts of federal judges to
aggregate and dispose of asbestos claims on a national basis).
50. INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE, supra note 45, at 141.
51.  See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 234 (2d Cir. 2008) (reversing
class certification of tobacco smokers due to individual differences among class members), rev’g
Schwab v. Philip Moris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 992 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Simon II Litig., 407
F.3d 125, 140 (2d. Cir.) (same), rev’g 211 F.R.D. 86 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).  Consolidation of punitive
damages may be particularly valuable in mass actions.  Full punishment should be given once.
As it now stands, large jury awards are subject to reduction under the Supreme Court’s rule that
punitive damages generally should not exceed compensatory damages by more than ten times
over. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) (holding that
single-digit punitive damage multipliers are “more likely to comport with Due Process”).  This
rule cuts off punitive damages from any relationship to total punishment or to a theory of dam-
ages to harmed individuals or the group.  When attempting consolidation, however, trial judges
have been stymied.  In one of my tobacco cases, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
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tively manage massive litigations leads to inefficient administration,
reduced ability of plaintiffs to sue effectively, limited opportunity for
defendants to pay for the full damages they caused, expense, and
delay.
B. Limitations on Individual Access to the Courts
We emphasize the right of individuals to control disposition of their
own legal disputes in courts, but we deny people the opportunity to
conduct personal private litigations.
The right of individuals to control the disposition of their legal dis-
putes in court is often used to justify limits on class actions and claim
aggregation.  Nevertheless, individual litigants’ effective access to
courts is restricted.52  The two most important litigation deficiencies
involving large numbers of potential injustices are those in which no
effective litigation can occur.  The first is the unavailability of lawyers
in civil cases for persons of limited means.53  The second is inadequa-
cies in institutional reform litigation.  Strict enforcement of adhesion
contracts and increased enforcement of private rights in criminal
courts and administrative agencies also undermine individual litiga-
tion.  The law has recently recognized the victim’s right to be heard
and seek restitution in criminal litigation.54  Administrative procedure
should be adjusted to meet the needs of injured victims by allowing
them to participate more effectively in the process as well.55
rejected a class action based on punitive damages. In re Simon II Litig., 407 F.3d at 136–40,
vacating 211 F.R.D. at 163–65.  If a punitive damage class were permitted, a single jury might
impose one comprehensive punishment.  This is preferable to many juries, each making a sepa-
rate judgment on the total punishment earned by the defendant. See, e.g., Martin Fackler &
Andrew Pollack, Jury Awards $9 Billion in Damages in Drug Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2014, at
B3 (reporting on In re Actos (Pioglitazone) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 6:11-md-2299, 2014 WL
2872299 (W.D. La. June 23, 2014)) (reporting that jury awarded $9 billion in punitive damages to
a single plaintiff).
52. See generally Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion,
Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78 (2011).
53. See Floyd v. Cosi, Inc., No. 14-CV-3772, 2015 WL 148458, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2015)
(discussing the unavailability of counsel for the indigent in most civil cases).
54. See infra Part III.B.4.
55. See Jack B. Weinstein, Compensation for Mass Private Delicts: Evolving Roles of Adminis-
trative, Criminal, and Tort Law, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 947, 976 [hereinafter Weinstein, Compensa-
tion for Mass Private Delicts] (noting that “those seeking to be protected or compensated are
usually only peripheral players in the administrative . . . system[ ]”); see also infra notes 74–79
and accompanying text.
266 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:251
1. Lack of Lawyers
Socioeconomic barriers prevent masses of immigrants, middle class,
and poor from effectively bringing their legal disputes to court.56  The
democratic model of litigation by the pro se plaintiff does not work
well.57  Lawyers are essential to help individuals navigate the com-
plexities of the modern justice systems.58
Pressure to meet this problem of lack of counsel is increasing.  The
growing gap between the super-rich and others,59 coupled with recent
Supreme Court cases lifting restrictions on the wealthy to finance
elections,60 tell us that the most powerful individuals increasingly in-
fluence legislatures.  The less powerful, more and more, will need to
turn to the courts for relief.
The United States system of contingent fees for plaintiffs with po-
tential money judgments helps.  So, too, may alternative financing.61
But neither is an adequate solution for lack of individual legal aid.
Congress has, in civil rights, disability, and other cases, provided for
legal fees to the plaintiff to encourage bringing of these suits.62  Small
boutique firms grow up around such cases.  They probably stir up
some inappropriate litigation, but also encourage enforcement of con-
gressional policy.
Masses of small individual claimants need lawyers.  At the same
time, there are too few jobs for present law graduates.63  Law schools
56. See generally Lois Bloom & Helen Hershkoff, Federal Courts, Magistrate Judges, and the
Pro Se Plaintiff, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 475 (2002); Jonathan D. Rosen-
bloom, Exploring Methods To Improve Management and Fairness in Pro Se Cases: A Study of the
Pro Se Docket in the Southern District of New York, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305, 310 (2002); Jack
B. Weinstein, Adjudicative Justice in a Diverse Mass Society, 8 J.L. & POL’Y 385 (2000).
57. Cf. Karen Sloan, An Access to Justice Scorebook; Report: Even the Best States Post So-So
Grades, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 3, 2014, at 1.
58. The Eastern District of New York, in partnership with the New York City Bar Associa-
tion, has launched an innovating pilot program to provide free legal assistance to non-prisoner,
pro se litigants in civil cases. See Floyd, 2015 WL 148458, at *3 (appending attorney job descrip-
tion for pilot program).
59. See generally Nelson D. Schwartz, The Middle Class Is Steadily Eroding. Just Ask the Busi-
ness World, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2014, at A1; Sabrina Tavernise, Middle-Class Areas Shrink as
Income Gap Grows, New Report Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2011, at A16.
60. See, e.g., McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1442 (2014) (holding that
statutory limitations on aggregate political donations violate the First Amendment); Citizens
United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) (holding that suppressing political
speech of corporations violates the First Amendment).
61. See sources cited infra note 111.
62. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) (2012) (“The court may request an attorney to represent any
such person unable to employ counsel.”); Act of Oct. 14, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-447, 84 Stat. 916,
919 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3006A to authorize payment for appointed counsel in habeas cases).
63. See generally Joel Stashenko, No Easy Answers for Challenges Faced by Nation’s Law
Schools, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 30, 2014, at 1; Ross Todd, ABA’s Task Force on Legal Education Issues
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and practitioners are beginning to work together to help create a new
paradigm in legal representation and training to meet these massive
unmet legal needs.64  We need programs, such as those supported by
Chief Judge of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals Robert Katzman
and Chief Judge of New York State and the New York Court of Ap-
peals Jonathan Lippmann, to put young lawyers to work serving those
in need.65
2. Restrictions on Institutional Litigation
The second largest group of persons needing protection is those in
badly operated public institutions.  Litigation that reforms prisons,
schools, and homes for the aged will increasingly affect the people in
these institutions, as well as those who will finance, oversee, and ad-
minister them.  I learned this early in my school desegregation cases,
prison cases, and cases involving the developmentally disabled.66
Pressure to reduce the effectiveness of such litigation continues.  As
Professor Margo Schlanger put the matter:
Institutional reform litigation is not a judicial movement but a
political practice.  How courts began, and whether they continue, to
be an arena for such litigation; how the litigation looks; and whether
it succeeds or fails are functions not simply of judicial will and role,
but of the goals, resources, and actions of many groups and actors,
filtered through the rules of litigation. . . . [W]e must free ourselves
from our long-bred urge to talk only about judges and open our
eyes instead to the full range of participants and forces at work.67
Report but Won’t Seek Quick Action, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 29, 2014, at 2; Deborah Jones Merritt, What
Happened to the Class of 2010? Empirical Evidence of Structural Change in the Legal Profession,
2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2577272.
64. See generally N.Y.C. BAR, DEVELOPING LEGAL CAREERS AND DELIVERING JUSTICE IN
THE 21ST CENTURY (2013) (“A Report by The New York City Bar Association Task Force on
New Lawyers in a Changing Profession”); A.B.A. TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL EDU-
CATION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2014).
65. The Immigrant Justice Corps trains recent law graduates in immigration law and then
sends them to community-based organizations for two years of service. See generally IMMI-
GRANT JUSTICE CORPS, http://justicecorps.org/our-story/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2015); Tania Karas,
Order Prompts Expansion of Immigrant Justice Corps, N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 1, 2014), http://
www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202677608150/Order-Prompts-Expansion-of-Immigrant-Jus-
tice-Corps; Kirk Semple, Seeking Better Legal Help for Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2013, at
A19. See also  Fern A. Fisher, Launch Pads and Incubators, Providing Access to Justice Using
Law Graduates and New Lawyers, A.B.A. JUDGES’ J., Winter 2014, at 4.
66. See, e.g., Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd., 383 F. Supp. 769, 770 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff’d sub nom.
Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975). See generally Soc’y for Good Will to
Retarded Children v. Carey, 466 F. Supp. 722 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
67. Margo Schlanger, Beyond the Hero Judge: Institutional Reform Litigation as Litigation, 97
MICH. L. REV. 1994, 2036 (1999) (footnote omitted) (reviewing MALCOLM M. FEELEY & ED-
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Prisoners suffer in poorly run jails and are then denied effective entry
to courthouses.68
3. Binding Arbitration
Compelling strict enforcement of adhesion contracts for arbitration
prevents many individuals from effectively bringing their legal dis-
putes to court.69  Binding arbitration clauses are a standard feature of
agreements for the sale of consumer goods and for healthcare, insur-
ance, banking, and credit card service agreements.  These contracts,
forced on consumers, do not allow for arm’s-length negotiations.70
They are offered on a “take it or be denied service” basis.  “Arbitra-
tion in itself is not the problem; lack of [real] consent is.”71  Consum-
ers or employees may be unaware that their right to resolve legal
disputes in court has been replaced by a private adjudication system
until they seek legal redress.72  Entire classes of litigants and catego-
ries of claims are disappearing from the courts, sucked into a private
realm of justice controlled by the powerful.
WARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS RE-
FORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS (1998)).
68. See Margo Schlanger & Giovanna Shay, Preserving the Rule of Law in America’s Jails and
Prisons: The Case for Amending the Prision Litigation Reform Act, 11 UNIV. PA. J. CONST. L.
139, 142 (2008) (noting the Prison Litigation Reform Act is “preventing inmates from raising
legitimate claims” in many instances (footnote omitted)). See generally Margo Schlanger, In-
mate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555 (2003). But see Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1926
(2011) (citing to Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1316 (E.D. Cal. 1995), where the court
appointed a special master to implement and oversee remedial plans involving mentally ill in-
mates who were not given access to treatment); Margo Schlanger, Plata v. Brown and Realign-
ment: Jails, Prisons, Courts, and Politics, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 165, 215 (2013) (“[T]he
California prisoners’ rights bar is mobilizing to attack unlawful jail conditions on several
fronts.”).
69. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750–53 (2011) (holding that a
state class arbitration scheme was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act due to its interfer-
ence with arbitration based on factors including the law’s detrimental effects on individual claim-
ants); Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 130 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2010) (permitting individual
arbitration in order to further the goals of arbitration, namely speediness and cost-effectiveness).
70. See, e.g., Berkson v. Gogo LLC, No. 14–CV–1199, 2015 WL 1600755, at *19 (E.D.N.Y.
Apr. 9, 2015) (noting how these types of contracts, also known as “contracts of adhesion,” have
become ubiquitous in modern consumers’ commercial transactions).
71. Ana Maria, Arbitration and Fairness in the United States, STANFORD L. SCH. BLOG (Apr.
24, 2014), http://blogs.law.stanford.edu/gouldcenterblog/2012/04/24/arbitration-and-fairness-in-
the-united-states/; see also Jack B. Weinstein, Some Benefits and Risks of Privatization of Justice
Through ADR, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 241, 245 (1996).
72. See generally Berkson, 2015 WL 1600755.
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4. Enforcement of Private Rights in Criminal and Administrative
Proceedings73
Shifting the enforcement of private rights to criminal courts and ad-
ministrative agencies has reduced the need for individual civil litiga-
tion.  In criminal law, there has been an expansion of fraud actions,
the creation of so-called racketeer influenced criminal actions, and a
vast increase in environmental and consumer protection prosecu-
tions—many of which might have been prosecuted as private tort ac-
tions.74  In the administrative arena, powerful agencies have been
created to protect the broader public against dangers of injury
through regulations, orders for recalls, fines, injunctions, and orders
for disgorgement and restitution.75
Juxtaposed with current pressure on courts to reduce private mass
litigation, these developments present the danger of alienating indi-
vidual victims from the legal process.  In the administrative and crimi-
nal law systems, individuals seeking to be protected or compensated
are usually peripheral players.76  By contrast, in the traditional tort
model, the individual litigant and groups play a central role.77
Criminal sentencing now emphasizes victim hearings on sentencing,
restitution, and seizing of assets through forfeiture as well as punish-
ment.78  The right of the crime victim to be heard in criminal prosecu-
tions may not provide full protection to the injured.  When I have had
criminal cases or administrative cases and there are pending (or po-
tential) private civil class actions, I have attempted to coordinate
them.  Administrative and executive action should be adjusted to
meet individual needs of the injured victims by allowing them to par-
ticipate in the process.  Agencies would do well to follow the develop-
ments we have seen in criminal law, providing for victims’ statements,
restitution, and the seizing of assets through forfeiture, coordinating
their work with that of private attorneys.79
73. See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text.
74. See generally Weinstein, Compensation for Mass Private Delicts, supra note 55.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 976.
77. See generally John C. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and
the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524 (2005).
78. See, e.g., Crime Victims’ Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 108–405, §§ 101–104, 118 Stat. 2260,
2261–65 (2004) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3771).
79. See Weinstein, Compensation for Mass Private Delicts, supra note 55, at 956.
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C. Aggregation
Appellate courts and legislatures have instructed us to favor indi-
vidual handling of disputes, but it is a reality of modern mass complex
litigation that carefully monitored aggregation is often necessary to
ensure efficient and effective resolution of disputes.
1. Class Action
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were based on a theory of
trans-substantive uniformity.80  Because procedural mechanisms will
always be playing catch up to the needs imposed by changing condi-
tions of life, the federal procedural rules were designed to be suffi-
ciently flexible to apply to any area of substantive law.81  For this
system to work well, trial judges must be entrusted with discretion to
ensure that the broadly conceived procedural tools are effectively
deployed to resolve specific substantive disputes.
Adapting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to the problems of
mass society is an ever-pressing concern.82  Prior to proposing the
1966 amendments to Rule 23, the advisory committee vigorously de-
bated its application to mass torts.83  Although its report concluded
that class actions should be available in such cases, the contours of its
application have remained in dispute.84
At times, legislatures and courts have expanded the availability of
class actions and other methods of encouraging aggregation.  In the
1960s and 1970s, for example, legislatures increased statutory protec-
80. Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84
YALE L.J. 718, 718 (1975). See generally Stephen B. Burbank, Summary Judgment, Pleading,
and the Future of Transsubstantive Procedure, 43 AKRON L. REV. 1189 (2010); Rules Enabling
Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072).
81. Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q. 297, 300 (1938) (“The trend
of procedural rules towards undue rigidity is often at variance with a developing substantive law.
New political and economic forces are likely to force new relationships between persons, and
new governmental attempts to control such relationships, while the process of enforcement be-
comes ever slower and more cumbersome.”).
82. For an early identification of the changes in law brought about by mass society, see Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
Our law of torts comes from the old days of isolated, ungeneralized wrongs, assaults,
slanders, and the like, where the damages might be taken to lie where they fell by legal
judgment.  But the torts with which our courts are kept busy to-day are mainly the
incidents of certain well known businesses. . . . The liability for them is estimated, and
sooner or later goes into the price paid by the public.
Id. at 467.
83. John K. Rabiej, The Making of Class Action Rule 23—What Were We Thinking?, 24 MISS.
C. L. REV. 323, 327 (2005) (“Class actions take many forms. . . . It is extremely difficult to draft a
single rule that fits all these variances.”).
84. Id. at 336–43.  For an excellent workbook, see Federal Courts Comm. City Bar Ctr. for
Continuing Legal Educ., N.Y.C. Bar, The Future of Class Actions (Mar. 3, 2015).
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tions for aggrieved parties,85 while courts revisited fundamental con-
cepts of duty, causation, and damages.86  In the last decade, by
contrast, we have seen a movement toward contracting the availability
of class actions.
Two cases from the 2010 Supreme Court term highlight this trend.87
In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,88 the Court enforced a waiver
of class arbitration that had been found unconscionable by the state
court.89  After individuals have already been pushed out of the court-
room and into the arbitration room,90 they now find themselves with-
out a realistic, cost-effective means to seek redress by aggregating
their claims in arbitration.91
In the Rule 23 context, the Court’s ruling in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes92 heightened the commonality requirement at the expense of
meeting individual needs.93  It emphasized uniformity at the expense
of the diversity of parties seeking help from the courts and cast doubt
on the utility of statistical analysis of large numbers of cases in ad-
dressing individual circumstances.
Appellate court skepticism about statistical analysis purportedly
protects due process, yet it too often prevents us from understanding
the experience of individuals in the larger context of a national econ-
omy.  It blocks courts from dealing effectively with the grievances of
individuals.  Without broad sociological and statistical data, systematic
problems merely effervesce as anecdote.  And without aggregation,
85. For examples of consumer protection laws, see Consumer Protection from Deceptive Acts
and Practices, N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 349–350(e) (McKinney 2012) (enacted in 1980); and Con-
sumer Legal Remedies Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1750–1784 (West 2012) (enacted in 1970).  For
attorney’s fees, see Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2012).
86. PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC DISASTERS IN THE COURTS
27 (1986) (“Generally speaking, the judicial innovations of the 1960s and 1970s made it much
easier for a plaintiff [to have his case] submitted to a jury.”).
87. See Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Failing Faith in Class Actions: Wal-Mart v.
Dukes and AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 7 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y (SPECIAL ISSUE)
73 (2011).
88. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
89. Id. at 1753.
90. Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Mod-
ern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 375 (2005) (“Developed in the late 1990s by marketers
for one of the arbitral bodies, among others, the [class action] waiver works in tandem with
standard arbitration provisions to ensure that any claim against the corporate defendant may be
asserted only in a one-on-one, non-aggregated arbitral proceeding.” (footnotes omitted)).
91. See generally Max Helveston, Promoting Justice Through Public Interest Advocacy in
Class Actions, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 749 (2012).
92. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
93. Id. at 2550–52 (holding that class certification depends on common answers, not common
questions).
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economic impacts on individuals are too diffuse for appropriate legal
accounting.94
Increasingly deft handling of class actions by trial judges can make
them more protective of individuals when class certification is allowed
under Rule 23.  When Federal District Judge Alvin Hellerstein was
presented with a proposed settlement for injuries resulting from 9/11,
he recognized the need for the court to step in and ensure a fair result.
He rejected the plan, even though no party in court opposed it,95 be-
cause it did not provide, in his view, sufficient payment to the plain-
tiffs.  The parties returned with a new proposed settlement that
increased plaintiffs’ recovery by over $100 million.96  Federal District
Judge Anita Brody rejected a proposed settlement in a multidistrict
litigation involving injuries suffered by players in the National Foot-
ball League.  She was concerned that there would not be sufficient
funds to fairly pay all claimants.97  To be effective, as these examples
show, a judge must supervise the discovery, settlement, pretrial, and
trial process to protect the many as well as the few.
2. Alternate Modes of Aggregation
Attorneys and judges have looked to avenues beyond class certifica-
tion for aggregating mass trials and settlements.98  These include both
formal and informal systems.  Among the formal systems, most signifi-
cant has been the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation and state
equivalents.99   This system of “consolidation” has been used to create
quasi-class actions that allow judges to appoint lead counsel and shape
attorneys’ compensation without certifying a class under Rule 23.100
94. See generally DAVID H. KAYE & DAVID A. FREEDMAN, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE
GUIDE ON STATISTICS (3d ed. 2011).
95. JOEL COHEN, BLINDFOLDS OFF: JUDGES ON HOW THEY DECIDE 104–18 (2014).
96. Id. at 120; see also Alvin K. Hellerstein et al., Managerial Judging: The 9/11 Responders’
Tort Litigation, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 127, 175–76 (2012) (citing Transcript of Status Conference
at 8, In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., No. 21-MC-100 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. June 10,
2010)).
97. In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 961 F. Supp. 2d 708, 716
(E.D. Pa. 2014); see also Order, No. 12-md-0002323 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 2015) (offering amend-
ments to proposed final settlement); Kat Greene, NFL Concussion Judge Wants Changes to $765
Settlement, LAW 360 (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/617634/nfl-concussion-judge-
wants-changes-to-765m-settlement (summarizing settlement negotiations).
98. See generally Jack B. Weinstein & Eileen B. Hershenov, The Effect of Equity on Mass Tort
Law, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 269.
99. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 602 (McKinney 2012) (consolidation of claims in New York);
N.J. R. SUPER. CT., TAX. CT. & SUR. CTS. 4:38-1 (consolidation of claims in New Jersey).
100. Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 469,
480–81 (1994); see In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 496–97 (E.D.N.Y.
2006); see also In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05-
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Informal coordination among counsel can effectively consolidate
claims.  A handful of firms often represent a large proportion of the
plaintiffs by agreement with other individual forwarding attorneys.
Counsel may also enter into joint-defense agreements to pool their
resources.  They can obtain private funding for mass litigation.  A few
attorneys can then negotiate block settlements between large groups
of plaintiffs and defendants.
Trial courts are devising new ways of consolidating court cases de-
spite pressure from appellate courts and legislatures to reduce private
mass litigations.  Substantial groups of individual judges acting on
their own initiative can structure these cases to provide effective mass
litigation.  Individual judges and those in a multijudge district court
can consolidate their own cases.  Related cases can be transferred be-
tween courts and judges.101  It is not uncommon for a state judge to
pick up the phone to call a federal judge with a similar case, and vice
versa.102
The administration of large government and private compensation
funds, with the aid of special masters, in both class and nonclass ac-
tions, is a critical aspect of handling important mass torts.103  In
unique circumstances, the legislature has participated in this process.
In the weeks after the attacks on September 11, 2001, Congress passed
the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act,104 which
required any lawsuits against the airlines to be brought in New York
City and limited them to the financial liability of the airlines.  The Act
coupled these restrictions on litigation with the September 11th Vic-
tim Compensation Fund.  In exchange for relinquishing litigation
rights, victims could apply to the Fund to receive compensation with-
out having to prove liability by the airline.105  Kenneth Feinberg was
able to settle almost every claim arising from this disaster using matri-
ces and individual meetings with the aggrieved.
1708 (DWF/AJB), 2008 WL 682174, at *18–19 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2008); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab.
Litig., 574 F. Supp. 2d 606, 616–18 (E.D. La. 2008).
101. S.D.N.Y. & E.D.N.Y. CT. R. 50.3; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2012) (“For the convenience
of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action
. . . .”).
102. See U.S. J.P.M.L. & FED. JUDICIAL CTR., TEN STEPS TO BETTER CASE MANAGEMENT: A
GUIDE FOR MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION TRANSFEREE JUDGES 6–7 (2d ed. 2014).
103. Cf. Bill Vlasic & Matthew L. Wald, G.M. Takes a Step Toward Families, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 2, 2014, at B1.
104. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107–42, 115 Stat. 230
(2001).
105. KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH?: THE UNPRECEDENTED EFFORT TO
COMPENSATE THE VICTIMS OF 9/11, at 50–60 (2005).
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Following the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, British Petroleum (BP)
agreed to create a $20 billion compensation fund to be monitored by
the Department of Justice and administered by Kenneth Feinberg.  In
many instances, BP avoided arguing over legal liability in the courts
and instead focused on quickly settling valid claims.106  Eventually, a
class action settlement was reached and upheld on appeal.107
The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) has taken a variant of the
Rule 23 approach to aggregate claims.  Under the FLSA, a group of
plaintiffs may bring a collective action through an opt-in procedure.108
The judgment of the court will then be binding only on those litigants
who opted in.  The statute imposes a relatively lenient standard for
certification.109
Each mode of aggregation attempts to provide litigants with a fair
and efficient resolution of their case.  This approach acknowledges
that, in our complex and diverse society, rough justice for many is
sometimes better than more perfect justice for only one.  The costs of
individualized litigation in both time and money are so great that ag-
gregated claims and compensation schemes, even when some will re-
ceive slightly more and others slightly less than they might get in an
individual case, provides a fair and viable option.  Speaking of asbes-
tos litigation, Justice Breyer, in dissent, pointed out that “the alterna-
tive to class-action settlement is not a fair opportunity for each
potential plaintiff to have his or her own day in court. . . . [M]ost
potential plaintiffs may not have a realistic alternative.”110
IV. TOWARD DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION
Perhaps the thesis of mass litigation efficiencies and antithesis of in-
dividual control can be resolved by the synthesis of more democratic
participation.
The democratic ideal that the legal process should treat every per-
son with fairness, equality, and dignity, and provide the right to be
heard, is fundamental to our conception of justice.  At the same time,
the need for aggregate litigation is increasing in today’s mass society.
Individual justice can coexist with efficient case management and ag-
106. KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHO GETS WHAT: FAIR COMPENSATION AFTER TRAGEDY AND
FINANCIAL UPHEAVAL 129–30 (2012).
107. See In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 820 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. BP
Exploration & Prod. Inc. v. Lake Eugenie Land & Dev., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 754 (2014).
108. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012).
109. See generally 7B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1807 (3d ed. 2013).
110. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 867–68 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
2015] UNIFORMITY AND INDIVIDUALITY 275
gregation.111  The inherent tension between individual justice and
mass resolution of complex litigation presents difficult, at times baf-
fling, questions, but they can be resolved.
Small, individual claimants often have little idea of what is going on
in their cases despite the fact that their own lives have been affected.
This detachment is heightened in the context of aggregate litigation.
Those injured may feel left out, disaffected, and resentful.  Litigators
are not always candid with clients who did not directly retain them,
and they may take advantage of those clients they will never meet.
When faced with an individual plaintiff and defendant, I have begun
requiring the parties to attend hearings.112  This serves to return the
individual to the center of the process.  A question remains: to what
extent is it possible, and desirable, to provide parties with the capacity
to participate in the process of mass actions?113
Judges in mass actions have a responsibility to ensure that the litiga-
tion stays focused on the parties and remains responsive to their ac-
tual needs.  We must make decisions that require us to know about
and protect both plaintiffs and defendants.  Learning what is going on
in the real world, outside of the courthouse, and connecting with the
parties and lawyers is critical.  It is much more difficult for judges to
make connections and exercise the requisite oversight in massive
111. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Disaggregating, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 667, 670–71
(“On one hand, aggregation allows plaintiffs to present a united front and a credible threat to
defendants, but, on the other, it weakens their autonomy when pursuing claims that are deeply
personal. . . . [A]ggregating could fulfill procedural justice goals by bringing plaintiffs together
and encouraging them to reason together about appropriate litigation ends, deliberate about
how to best achieve those ends collectively, and pursue those ends with concerted force.”).  The
availability of alternative litigation financing in the form of consumer legal funding, subprime
lending to plaintiffs’ law firms, and investments in commercial lawsuits, has grown considerably
in recent years. See STEVEN GARBER, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, ALTERNATIVE LITIGA-
TION FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES: ISSUES, KNOWNS, AND UNKNOWNS 1 (2010).  This in-
creasing availability of alternative financing may lead to a more democratic litigation system but
it also raises special ethical issues for attorneys and judges. See Jack B. Weinstein, The Democra-
tization of Mass Actions in the Internet Age, 45 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 451, 464–70 (2012)
[hereinafter Weinstein, Democratization of Mass Actions]. See generally Symposium, Third-
Party Financing of Litigation: Civil Justice Friend or Foe?, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 405 (2012);
Suevon Lee, Litigation Funder Blocked from Suing on Champerty Grounds, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 3,
2014, at 1; A.B.A. Comm’n on Ethics, White Paper on Alternative Litigation Financing (Oct. 19,
2011) (unpublished draft), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administra-
tive/ethics_2020/20111019_draft_alf_white_paper_posting.authcheckdam.pdf.
112. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on
the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 344 &
n.214 (2013) (outlining the process of Jack B. Weinstein).
113. See, e.g., Weinstein, Democratization of Mass Actions, supra note 111, at 461–64 (discuss-
ing problems with litigants getting involved with such matters as settlement).
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cases.  Yet, it is crucial that they do so.114  Looking through the curtain
between the judge and the rest of the world is essential.
Increasingly, new technologies and techniques are making it possi-
ble for judges to stay connected and for parties to stay informed and
participate in aggregate litigation.115  In the cases before me, I have
tried to provide plaintiffs in mass actions with an increased degree of
control and transparency.  A few instances illustrate the techniques
being used by judges.
We use special masters as eyes and ears.  In the Agent Orange prod-
ucts liability litigation,116 special master Kenneth Feinberg and I
toured the nation to get input from veterans.  In the California String-
fellow case, which consolidated individual hazardous waste claims,
Professor Arthur Miller met with groups of clients to fill them in on
the background of the case.117  In the diethylstilbestrol (DES) cases,
where the plaintiffs were women whose mothers had taken the drug
during their pregnancy, I met with groups of those women after their
cases were settled to try to explain what went on.  Kenneth Feinberg
made himself available to each of the 9/11 claimants,118 and Judge Al-
vin Hellerstein has consulted closely with groups of those affected by
the post-9/11 cleanup litigation.119  In Boykin, the clerk of our court
arranged for all of those who were prospective class members to ob-
tain access to the filed documents and to listen to a streaming video of
courtroom proceedings.120
These democratization techniques using modern technology do not
solve the fundamental problems of mass litigation.  They do, however,
begin to return the affected individuals to the center of massive litiga-
tion.  The process might be summed up as follows:
One person among many
listens speaks
through modern technology.
114. Weinstein, Dealing with the Real World, supra note 20 (manuscript at 3–4) (“Rule 1: Be
humble.  Listen.  Try to learn what’s going on.  If you need to: Get out of the courthouse.”).
115. See, e.g., Weinstein, Democratization of Mass Actions, supra note 111.
116. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
117. Weinstein, Democratization of Mass Actions, supra note 111, at 459 (discussing Newman
v. Stringfellow, No. 16-59-94 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 9, 1995)).
118. FEINBERG, supra note 105, at 50–60.
119. See Alvin K. Hellerstein, Democratization of Mass Tort Litigation: Presiding over Mass
Tort Litigation To Enhance Participation and Control by the People Whose Claims Are Being
Asserted, 45 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 473, 475 (2012).
120. Boykin v. 1 Prospect Park ALF, LLC, 292 F.R.D. 161, 161 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
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V. CONCLUSION
Whether the law emphasizes the individual or uniformity depends
on a judgment that varies from time to time.  At the moment, the tide
is moving in the general direction of concern for the special needs of
single parties in sentencing and civil rights.  Increasingly, insistence on
individual control in economic rights cases often hurts rather than
helps the individuals with grievances.  Effective litigation becomes too
burdensome for them.  Gaps in legal protections for the poor, the
middle class, and those in institutions, threatens to become even
greater than in the past.  Major reforms are needed.  Even where uni-
formity is stressed, as in aggregate actions, modern technology pro-
vides the possibility of greater individual lay participation.
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